Some Strong Conditionals for Sentential Logics by Zarri, Jason
1 
 
Some Strong Conditionals for Sentential Logics 
Jason Zarri 
 
[11/18/2012] 
[Note: This is a rough draft intended to be circulated to get feedback. 
Links are welcome, but please do not cite. 
Comments can be sent to: jlzarri@scholardarity.com] 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 In this article I define a strong conditional for classical sentential logic, and then extend it 
to three non-classical sentential logics. It is stronger than the material conditional and is not 
subject to the standard paradoxes of material implication, nor is it subject to some of the standard 
paradoxes of C. I. Lewis’s strict implication. My conditional has some counterintuitive 
consequences of its own, but I think its pros outweigh its cons. In any case, one can always 
augment one’s language with more than one conditional, and it may be that no single conditional 
will satisfy all of our intuitions about how a conditional should behave. Finally, I suspect the 
strong conditional will be of more use for logic rather than the philosophy of language, and I will 
make no claim that the strong conditional is a good model for any particular use of the indicative 
conditional in English or other natural languages. Still, it would certainly be a nice bonus if some 
modified version of the strong conditional could serve as one. 
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 I begin by exploring some of the disadvantages of the material conditional, the strict 
conditional, and some relevant conditionals. I proceed to define a strong conditional for classical 
sentential logic. I go on to adapt this account to Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox, to S. C. 
Kleene’s logic K3, and then to J. Łukasiewicz’s logic Ł, a standard version of fuzzy logic. 
 
2. Extant Conditionals: Material, Strict, and Relevant  
 In classical sentential logic, all conditionals are treated as material conditionals, also 
called material implications. The truth table for the material conditional, which is expressed by 
the symbol ‘⊃’, is: 
p q p ⊃ q 
1 1 1 
1 0 0 
0 1 1 
0 0 1 
 
Though this account of conditionals has some puzzling consequences, the truth table is not itself 
hard to interpret.1 Since the properties of the material conditional are something of a mixed bag, I 
will divide its assessment into three subsections. 
 
                                                                 
1
 For those who aren’t familiar with truth tables or the material conditional, to put things as simply as I can: p ⊃ q is 
read as “If p then q”, or “p implies q,” where one can substitute arbitrary sentences for ‘p’ and ‘q’. The sentence 
substituted for ‘p’ is called the antecedent of the conditional, and the one substituted for ‘q’ is called the 
conditional’s consequent. One reads the rows of the truth table from left to right, starting with the first row and 
working one’s way down until one reaches the last row. Each row represents the “truth values” that sentences can 
take, with ‘1’ representing truth and ‘0’ representing falsity on a given evaluation. In the first row, a ‘1’ occurs in the 
column under p, which means that p is true on the evaluation being considered, and the ‘1’ in the column under q in 
that row means that q is also true on that evaluation. The ‘1’ in the column under p ⊃ q on that same row means that 
it too is true on that evaluation. Thus, what this row tells us is that if p and q are both true then p ⊃ q must be true 
too. Once one has understood how to evaluate this row, one can apply the same method to evaluate the other rows. 
In sum, what the truth table says is that p ⊃ q is false when p is true and q is false; and is true in all other cases. 
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1. The Good: The material conditional satisfies the rule of inference called Modus Ponens: If we 
let ‘’ represent an arbitrary type of conditional, Modus Ponens tells us that from p and p  q 
one can infer q. One can tell by inspecting the truth table for the material conditional that if p and 
p ⊃ q are both true then so is q. In the second and fourth rows, the only cases where q is false, 
either p is false or p ⊃ q is false. Since Modus Ponens is valid, inferring q from p and p ⊃ q will 
never take one from truth to falsity. 
2. The Bad: Because the material conditional is a truth functional operator—one whose truth 
value is determined solely by the truth values of its component sentences—one  cannot tell 
whether it is true without knowing the truth values of p and/or q. If you know that p is false then 
you know that p ⊃ q is true, whatever the truth value of q may be. And if you know that q is true 
then you know that p ⊃ q is true, whatever the truth value of p may be. If all you know is that p is 
true, or if all you know is that q is false, you cannot determine the truth value of p ⊃ q. Among 
other things, this means you cannot use Modus Ponens without knowing whether q is true or false. 
You can only apply Modus Ponens if you know that p and p ⊃ q are both true, and if you know 
that p is true you can’t know whether p ⊃ q is true without knowing whether q is true. If you 
already know that q is true, you don’t need to infer its truth from anything. And if you already 
know that q is false, you know that you cannot infer its truth from anything—if you had a valid 
argument with q as its conclusion, you would know that that argument must be unsound.  So 
while the material conditional satisfies Modus Ponens, the fact that is does is not enough to make 
reasoning with it useful in practice. 
3. The Ugly: Ordinarily, when one asserts a conditional one implies that there is some sort of 
connection between its antecedent and its consequent. As an example, take the sentence “If that 
ball is red, then that ball has a color”. (We shall suppose this sentence is uttered in a context 
where it is clear which ball is meant.)  I’d wager that most people would say that the truth of the 
antecedent guarantees the truth of the consequent; if the ball under discussion is red, it just has to 
be true that it has a color. However, a material conditional can be true when its antecedent and 
consequent have nothing to do with each other. For instance, from the first row of the truth table 
it follows that every true sentence materially implies every other true sentence. Thus, “Electrons 
are negatively charged” materially implies “Neil Armstrong was the first man to walk on the 
Moon”. Yet no matter how true it may be, “If electrons are negatively charged then Neil 
Armstrong was the first man to walk on the Moon” would be an odd thing to say, to say the least. 
Also, it follows from the third and fourth rows of the truth table that a false sentence materially 
implies every true sentence as well as every false sentence. If we interpret the English ‘if...then…’ 
construction as a material conditional, the sentences “If bananas are vegetables then the sky is 
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blue” and “If George W. Bush is articulate then the Pope isn’t Catholic” are both true because 
their antecedents are both false. (In the author’s opinion the antecedent of the last material 
conditional is pretty clearly false. But however that may be, I’ll ask the reader to be kind enough 
to suppose that it is false for the sake of the ensuing discussion.)  The fact that the consequent of 
the first sentence is true and that the consequent of the second sentence is false makes no 
difference. The strangeness of these and similar sentences gives intuitive support to the view that 
‘⊃’ and the English ‘if…then…’ construction do not quite mean the same. 
These and other odd results are often referred to as the paradoxes of material implication. It is 
these “paradoxes” that drove C.I. Lewis to define a different conditional, called the strict 
conditional or strict implication, for which he used the symbol ‘⥽’ , which would not suffer from 
these and similar problems. In effect, Lewis defined strict implications as material implications 
that are necessarily true. Hence, to understand his account fully we will have to say a word about 
necessity. 
 One definition of necessary truth would be that a necessary truth is a statement which 
could not possibly be false. (By saying that so-and-so is possible, I refer how things could have 
turned out, whether they actually turned out that way or not, not to my or anyone else’s 
knowledge—or lack thereof—of how things actually did turn out. The notion of possibility at 
issue here is thus metaphysical rather than epistemological; it deals with the world as opposed to 
our knowledge of it.) Necessary truths hold “come what may,” as the philosopher W. V. O. 
Quine put it in his article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” [ref]. Take an elementary statement of 
arithmetic, say “7 + 5 = 12”. This statement doesn’t just happen to be true. Irrespective of how 
things actually did turn out, they could have turned out differently in many different ways; 
dinosaurs might never have become extinct, Immanuel Kant could have spent his entire career in 
a dogmatic slumber, and George W. Bush could have been ever so slightly more eloquent but no 
matter how different the world could have been, “7 + 5 = 12” would still have been true. Let us 
use the diamond symbol, ‘◊’, to mean ‘it is possibly the case that’, and the box symbol, ‘□’, to 
mean ‘it is necessarily the case that. Writhing “◊ 7 + 5 = 12” then has the effect of saying that “7 
+ 5 = 12” is possibly true, and writing “□ 7 + 5 = 12” has the effect of saying that “7 + 5 = 12” is 
necessarily true. We can give the meaning of □ p, in general as being equivalent to ¬ ◊ ¬ p, 
where ‘¬’ is the negation sign. (This is just a symbolic translation of the above definition of 
necessary truth.)  
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 Now that we are a little clearer on what □ p means, we can understand Lewis’s account of 
strict implication. He defines a strict conditional of the form p ⥽ q as being equivalent to □ (p ⊃ q) 
[ref].  On this definition, p ⥽ q holds only if p ⊃ q holds no matter what; in other worlds, it holds 
only if there is no possible situation in which p ⊃ q is false. In still other words, in order for p ⥽ q 
to be true, there cannot be any possible situation in which p is true while q is false.  
[…] 
3. CSL and its Meta-Language 
 Now it is time to make things a bit more formal. I shall begin my account of strong 
implication by giving a standard language for classical sentential logic (CSL). For atomic 
sentences, we will use capital letters from the entire alphabet, with numerical subscripts 
appended to them if necessary. As for connectives, we will use the symbols ¬ ,  ⋀ ,  ∨ ,  ⊃ , and  
≡ , respectively, for negation, conjunction, disjunction, material implication, and material 
equivalence. For brackets one can use parentheses, (, ); square brackets, [, ]; or curly brackets, 
{, }. It makes no difference which brackets are used where. I will use 1 and 0 as truth values, 1 
for true and 0 for false. Finally, the usual recursive clauses for constructing well-formed 
formulas—wffs, pronounced “woofs,” for short—from atomic sentences will be adopted.  All 
atomic sentences of CSL are wffs, and where p and q are arbitrary sentences of CSL: 
 1. If p is a wff, so is ¬ (p).2 
2. If p and q are wffs, so is (p ⋀ q). 
3. If p and q are wffs, so is (p ∨ q). 
4.  If p and q are wffs, so is (p ⊃ q). 
5.  If p and q are wffs, so is (p ≡ q). 
6. Nothing else is a wff of CSL. 
 Our meta- language3 for CSL, MCSL, will include the lowercase letters p, q, r, etc, all the 
way to the end of the alphabet, as meta-variables4; these have the same function as the letters we 
                                                                 
2
 However, if p is an atomic sentence, one doesn’t have to put brackets around it.  
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just used in giving the recursive clauses for wffs of CSL. They too may have subscripts 
appended to them if necessary. Any sentence of CSL also belongs to MCSL, though the reverse 
is not true.  Additionally, MCSL includes quote-names for sentences of the object-language. 
Thus the meta-linguistic term ‘A’ names the atomic sentence A of the object- language; the term 
‘B ⋀ C’ names the compound sentence B ⋀ C of the object language, and so on. The meta-
language will also have corner quotes,┌  and   ┐, which selectively quote logical connectives and 
brackets but not the meta-variables p, q, r, (etc.), so that it still makes sense to substitute 
sentences of  CSL for them.5 Finally, MCSL will contain a novel item, the meta- linguistic 
designator ┌(q|p)┐, a “conditional designator” which designates the truth value that q takes given 
that p is true, i.e., given that p has the value 1. It is to be read as ┌ the value of q given p┐ or ┌the 
value of q conditional on p┐. The stroke, |, is not a connective; it merely serves to separate the 
letter q from the letter p.  
 In order to be permissibly substituted into the designator ┌(q|p)┐, q and p must either be 
wffs of CSL, or else sentences of MCSL itself that have been formed from such a designator, or 
sentences which have been formed from a designator which was formed from a sentence which 
was formed from such a designator…  . Ultimately, any sentence that can appear inside the 
conditional designator will have been derived from a sentence of CSL, and no meta-variable will 
appear inside a conditional designator when it is actually being used. (We will see how novel 
sentences can be formed from designators in MCSL in the next section.) If all these conditions 
are met, we will say that ┌(q|p)┐is a well-formed designator—a wfd, pronounced “woofed,” for 
short—and if not, ┌(q|p)┐ is a non-well-formed designator. The conditional designator works like 
this: If p never takes the value 1, then ┌(q|p)┐ designates nothing—for q cannot take a value 
given that p is true if p can never be true—and is said to be empty. It is also empty if the value of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3
 A meta-language is a language that one uses to talk about another language, which is called the object-language. 
These notions are relat ional: The same language can be a meta-language of one language and an object language of 
another. In logic, formalized meta-languages are employed to talk about various formal logical systems in order to 
avoid the paradoxes and/or viciously circular defin itions that would ensue if one tried to use a formal language to 
make statements about itself.  
4
 A meta-variab le is a variable that belongs to the meta-language of a given language. Here we use the letters p, q, r, 
and so on as meta-variables in MCSL, for which any sentence of CSL can be substituted. 
5
 If we used ordinary quotation marks instead, the meta-variables would be included in the quoted material. For 
example, the sentence A ⋀ B is an instance of ┌p ⋀ q┐; that is, it is a sentence of CSL that is obtained from ┌p ⋀ q┐ 
by substituting the atomic letters A and B, respectively, for p and q—but the string of symbols ‘p ⋀ q’—notice the 
lack of corner-quotes!—belongs, not to CSL, but rather to its meta-language MCSL, and A ⋀ B is not an instance of 
‘p ⋀ q’, for that is a string of symbols: ‘p’ and ‘q’ are placeholders for sentences, and they themselves assert 
nothing. . 
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q varies when the value of p is 1, for in that case q doesn’t take a unique value given that p is true. 
If q always takes the value 1 when p takes the value 1, then ┌(q|p)┐ designates 1, and in our 
meta- language we can say that ┌(q|p)┐ = 1, which is another way of saying that ┌(q|p)┐ 
designates 1. Similarly, if q always takes the value 0 when p takes the value 1, then ┌(q|p)┐ 
designates 0, and in our meta-language we can say that ┌(q|p)┐ = 0. 
 We may include ┌(q|p)┐ in a truth table, as long as we remember that the values entered 
under it are the values it designates, not the values it has, i.e. none. (If it is not clear why I have 
characterized ┌(q|p)┐ as a designator, and not as an operator which forms sentences that have 
truth values of their own, consider what value(s) (A | A ⋀ ¬A) would have to have on such an 
approach. In classical logic, the assignment of multiple truth values to the same sentence is a 
Very Bad Thing. In section 5 we’ll explore a logic in which it isn’t.) In addition, I will enter the 
symbol ‘%’ under ┌(q|p)┐to mark the cases where it is empty. The following truth tables will 
illustrate some of the conditional designator’s logical properties: 
 
A ¬A  A ⋀ ¬A (A | A ⋀ ¬A) (A ⋀ ¬A | A) (A ⋀ ¬A | A ⋀ ¬A) 
1 0 0 % 0 % 
0 1 0 % 0 % 
 
A ¬A  A  ∨ ¬A (A | A ∨ ¬A) (A ∨ ¬A | A) (A ∨ ¬A | A ∨ ¬A) 
1 0 1 % 1 1 
0 1 1 % 1 1 
 
 
 
 
 
A B A ⋀ B (A | A) (B | A) (B | A ⋀ B) 
1 1 1 1 % 1 
1 0 0 1 % 1 
0 1 0 1 % 1 
0 0 0 1 % 1 
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4. The Strong Conditional Defined 
 With our meta- linguistic conditional designator ready to hand, we can now define what I 
call the strong conditional, or strong implication, for which I will use the symbol ‘→’. Its 
definition is (where ‘v( )’ is the valuation function, which gives the semantic value of an 
expression): 
 If ┌(q|p)┐= 1, then v(p → q) = 1 
 If ┌(q|p)┐= 0, then v(p → q) = 0 
 If ┌(q|p)┐ is empty, then v(p → q) = 0 
‘→’ is introduced in MCSL. A sentence of the form ┌p → q┐ is a wff of MCSL if and only if the 
corresponding designator ┌(q|p)┐ is a wfd of MCSL.  
 We can then extend CSL by adding in the strong conditional—as well as the 
corresponding strong equivalence connective, ‘↔’, defined as ┌( p → q) ⋀ (q → p)┐— obtaining 
the language I call CSL+. Its recursive clauses for constructing wffs from atomic sentences are 
the same as those for CSL, with two additions to govern our two new connectives:  
┌p → q┐ is a wff of CSL+ if and only if ┌p → q┐ is a wff of MCSL. 
┌p ↔ q┐ is a wff of CSL+ if and only if ┌p → q┐ and ┌q → p┐ are wffs of MCSL. 
We can obtain the following truth tables for ‘→,’ which are counterparts of the ones for ┌(q|p)┐ 
given above: 
 
A ¬A  A ⋀ ¬A (A ⋀ ¬A) → A  A → (A ⋀ ¬A)  (A ⋀ ¬A) → ( A ⋀ ¬A) 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
A ¬A  A  ∨ ¬A (A ∨ ¬A) → A  A → (A ∨ ¬A)  (A ∨ ¬A) → (A ∨ ¬A) 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 1 1 0 1 1 
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Furthermore, we have:  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
This last table shows that explosion, understood as the principle that contradictions imply 
everything, does not hold for ‘→’. However, because CSL+ is (quasi-) classical, contradictions 
still entail everything. This has the consequence that ┌p → q┐ can be false even if p entails q. 
Strong implication is thus, for lack of a better term, more discriminating than entailment.  
 It is a noteworthy fact that in CSL+, the “Law of Identity” is not valid in general. As one 
can tell by inspecting the truth tables I have given, nothing strongly implies a contradiction and 
contradictions strongly imply nothing, and so a fortiori they do not strongly imply themselves. 
We can call these facts the paradoxes of strong implication. In spite of them, every non-
contradictory sentence strongly implies itself, so the “Restricted Law of Identity”—if p is not a 
contradiction, then ┌p → p┐—is valid. 
 However, most common “paradoxes of material implication” do not have counterparts 
that hold for strong implication. For one thing, ¬A fails to entail A → B; so in general, a false 
sentence does not strongly imply every sentence. For another, B fails to entail A → B; so in 
general not every sentence strongly implies a true sentence. This means that, unlike the material 
A B A ⋀ B A → A  A → B (A ⋀ B) → B 
1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 1 
0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0 0 1 0 1 
A ¬A  B A ⋀ ¬A (A ⋀ ¬A) → B B → (A ⋀ ¬A) 
1 0 1 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 
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conditional, the joint truth of A and B does not entail A → B; in fact, no distinct atomic 
sentences strongly imply each other. However, we do have the result that every non-
contradictory sentence implies a tautology.  Modus Ponens also holds for ‘→’, as does Modus 
Tollens.6 [Show this] Since the truth values of sentences of the forms ┌p → q┐ and ┌p ↔ q┐ are 
sensitive both to the identity of p and q and their truth-functional structure, I will call them 
structure-sensitive connectives.  
The examples of formulas that we have given up to this point have all been fairly simple. 
We will now turn to sentences involving nested strong conditionals or strong equivalences, 
which are slightly more complex. To form such sentences we can start with this truth table of the 
meta- language MCSL: 
A B C A ⋀ B (A ⋀ B) ⋀ C (A ⋀ B | (A ⋀ B) ⋀ C) (A | A ⋀ B)   (A | (A ⋀ B) ⋀ C) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 
 
 Thus, in CSL+ we can have [(A ⋀ B) ⋀ C] → (A ⋀ B) and also (A ⋀ B) → A, as well as 
[(A ⋀ B) ⋀ C] → A. But what about [(A ⋀ B) ⋀ C] → [(A ⋀ B) → A]?  In the meta- language 
MCSL we can have this truth table: 
 
                                                                 
6
 Modus Tollens is a rule of inference which says, from p   q and ¬q, one can in fer ¬p.  
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A B C A ⋀ B (A ⋀ B) ⋀ C (A ⋀ B) → A ((A ⋀ B) → A | (A ⋀ B) ⋀ C)  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 
Here (A ⋀ B) → A takes the value 1 in the only case where (A ⋀ B) ⋀ C takes the value 1, so 
((A ⋀ B) → A | (A ⋀ B) ⋀ C) designates 1, which means the corresponding conditional, [(A ⋀ B) 
⋀ C] → [(A ⋀ B) → A], is true. 
 Can we have more deeply nested strong conditionals and equivalences in CSL+, or would 
we have to extend CSL+ to get a richer language to obtain them? Consider this sentence: 
A → (A → [(A ⋀ A) → (A ∨ A)]) 
Is this a wff of CSL+? We can begin its formulation by constructing a meta- linguistic truth table 
of MCSL, like so: 
 
A A ⋀ A A ∨ A (A ∨ A | A ⋀ A) (A ⋀ A) → (A ∨ A) ((A ⋀ A) → (A ∨ A) | A) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 1 
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Starting with the sentence of the fourth column, i.e. (A ∨ A | A ⋀ A), and working to the right, 
each formula is either a designator of MCSL formed from some of the sentences of the preceding 
columns, or else a strong conditional formed from such a designator of a preceding column. 
Continuing the table, we obtain: 
 
A → [(A ⋀ A) → (A ∨ A)] (A → [(A ⋀ A) → (A ∨ A)] | A) A → (A → [(A ⋀ A) → (A ∨ A)]) 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 
 
So far, it seems that the answer to our question of whether we have to extend our language 
beyond CSL+ is “No”: Given that it can handle some nested strong conditionals, it can handle 
them all.  […] 
 
5. A Strong Conditional for the Logic of Paradox 
 In this section I define a modified form of the strong conditional that will apply to our 
first example of a non-classical logic, which is an extension of Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox, 
or LP for short. LP is a “dialetheic” logic—one in which sentences may admissibly be deemed 
both true and false. It is motivated as a way to accept that some paradoxes, like the infamous Liar 
Paradox, are really what they appear to be: genuine contradictions. Whatever one may think of 
its motivation, it is, qua logic, an interesting system which merits investigation.  
 The language of LP, as I present it here, is much the same as the language of CSL. We 
will retain the same atomic sentences, connectives, brackets, and recursive clauses for well-
formed formulas. The main difference lies in the assignments of truth values to sentences. In LP 
there are three truth values, the sets {1}, {0}, and {1, 0}; {1} being interpreted as (exclusively) 
true, {0} being interpreted as (exclusively) false, and {1, 0} being interpreted as both true and 
false. LP is a first-order language, but I will omit the details pertaining to the quantifiers, 
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predicates, etc., because the issues we will consider concern only the propositional aspects of the 
language. Priest gives the following clauses for negation and conjunction, respectively [ref]: 
 
1 ∈ v(¬A)  iff  0 ∈ v(A) 
0 ∈ v(¬A)  iff 1 ∈ v(A) 
1 ∈ v(A ⋀ B)  iff 1 ∈ v(A) and 1 ∈ v(B) 
0 ∈ v(A ⋀ B)  iff 0 ∈ v(A) or 0 ∈ v(B) 
(Where ‘iff’ means ‘if and only if’).  That is, 1 (true) is a member of the value of “¬A” iff 0 (false) 
is a member of the value of A, and 0 is a member of the value of “¬A” iff 1 is a member of the 
value of A. Similarly, 1 is a member of the value of “A ⋀ B” iff 1 is both a member of the value 
of A and the value of B, and 0 is a member of the value of “A ⋀ B” iff  0 is either a member of 
the value of A or the value of B (or both). Similar clauses may be given for the other connectives, 
the construction of which I will leave as an exercise for the reader. 
 Let us proceed to the definition of the strong conditional. We start with our meta-
language for LP, i.e. MLP. MLP is much like MCSL. It includes the lowercase letters p, q, r, etc, 
as meta-variables, the sentences of LP itself, quote-names for both atomic and compound 
sentences of LP, corner quotes, and its own meta- linguistic designator ┌(q|p)┐. Since some 
sentences can actually take the value {1, 0} in this logic, our account of MLP’s designator will 
have to differ from the one we gave of MCSL’s. To determine what value ┌(q|p)┐ designates, we 
construct a truth table and check to see if there are any rows where 1 ∈ v(p). If not, ┌(q|p)┐ is 
empty. If there are, we check to see if 1 ∈ v(q) in every row where 1 ∈ v(p). If so, 1 ∈ ┌(q|p)┐ . In 
addition, we check to see if 0 ∈ v(q) in every row where 1 ∈ v(p). If so, we also have 0 ∈ ┌(q|p)┐. 
If neither 1 nor 0 is a member of v(q) on every evaluation where 1 ∈ v(p), ┌(q|p)┐ is empty.  
We’ll begin our definition of strong implication for LP+ by appealing to the following 
truth table of MLP: 
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The definition of strong implication for the extended language LP+  is then: 
If ┌(q|p)┐  = {1}, then v(p → q) = {1} 
 If ┌(q|p)┐ = {0}, then v(p → q) = {0} 
If ┌(q|p)┐ = {1, 0}, then v(p → q) = {1, 0} 
 If ┌(q|p)┐ is empty, then v(p → q) = {0}. 
 
Given our truth table for ┌(q|p)┐and this definition, we can obtain this truth table for strong 
implication in LP+: 
 
 
 
 
A ¬A  B (A ⋀ ¬A) (A | A ⋀ ¬A) (A ⋀ ¬A | A) (B | A ⋀ ¬A) (A ⋀ ¬A | B) 
1 0 1 0 1, 0 0 % 0 
1 0 0 0 1, 0 0 % 0 
0 1 1 0 1, 0 0 % 0 
0 1 0 0 1, 0 0 % 0 
1 0 1, 0 0 1, 0 0 % 0 
1, 0 1, 0 1 1, 0 1, 0 0 % 0 
0 1 1, 0 0 1, 0 0 % 0 
1, 0 1, 0 0 1, 0 1, 0 0 % 0 
1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 0 % 0 
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In LP+, strong implication satisfies Modus Ponens in this sense: If 1 ∈ v(p), and p → q,  1 ∈ v(q). 
This is significant because in LP the only candidate conditional is the material conditional, and it 
does not satisfy Modus Ponens.   […] 
 
6. A Strong Conditional for K3 
 I’ll now sketch a strong conditional for the logic K3, a language which is basically the 
same as LP except that the third value is interpreted as “neither true nor false” rather than “both 
true and false.” The language has much in common with LP, the only important difference being 
the notation for the truth values. We will continue to use 1 for truth and 0 for falsity, and 
introduce the letter n for “neither true nor false”.  
 As usual, we introduce a conditional designator in the meta-language of K3, MK3. To 
evaluate ┌(q|p)┐for a given truth table, we check to see if there is a row of the table where v(p) = 
1. If not, ┌(q|p)┐ is empty. If there is a row where v(p) = 1, we check to see if v(q) = 1 in every 
row where v(p) = 1, and if it does, ┌(q|p)┐ = 1. If v(q) = 0 in every row where v(p) = 1, ┌(q|p)┐ = 
0. If v(q) = n in every row where v(p) = 1, then ┌(q|p)┐ =n. As always, if v(q) varies when  v(p) = 
1, ┌(q|p)┐is empty. In light of this, we have these truth tables: 
A ¬A  B (A ⋀ ¬A) (A ⋀ ¬A) → A (A ⋀ ¬A) → B A → (A ⋀ ¬A) B → (A ⋀ ¬A) 
1 0 1 0 1, 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1, 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 1, 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 1, 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1, 0 0 1, 0 0 0 0 
1, 0 1, 0 1 1, 0 1, 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1, 0 0 1, 0 0 0 0 
1, 0 1, 0 0 1, 0 1, 0 0 0 0 
1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 0 0 0 
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A ¬A  A ⋀ ¬A (A | A ⋀ ¬A) (A ⋀ ¬A | A) (A ⋀ ¬A | A ⋀ ¬A) 
1 0 0 % 0 % 
n n n % 0 % 
0 1 0 % 0 % 
 
 
A ¬A  A  ∨ ¬A (A | A ∨ ¬A) (A ∨ ¬A | A) (A ∨ ¬A | A ∨ ¬A) 
1 0 1 % 1 1 
n n n % 1 1 
0 1 1 % 1 1 
 
 
 
In the extended language K3+ we could then get corresponding truth tables with the strong 
conditional in place of the conditional designator by a process which is by now familiar enough 
A ¬A  B (A ⋀ ¬A) (B | A ⋀ ¬A) (A ⋀ ¬A | B) A  ∨ ¬A (B |  A  ∨ ¬A) (A  ∨ ¬A | B) 
1 0 1 0 % % 1 % % 
1 0 0 0 % % 1 % % 
0 1 1 0 % % 1 % % 
0 1 0 0 % % 1 % % 
1 0 n 0 % % 1 % % 
n n 1 n % % n % % 
0 1 n 0 % % 1 % % 
n n 0 n % % n % % 
n n n n % % n % % 
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that I shall spare the reader the details. What is distinctive about K3+ is that, since sentences 
which are tautologies in CSL can be neither true nor false in K3+, and hence not true, sentences 
of can K3+ can fail to strongly imply a tautology. B fails to strongly imply A  ∨ ¬A , for B can 
have the value 1 while A  ∨ ¬A  has the value n. However, A still strongly implies A  ∨ ¬A, since 
A  ∨ ¬A cannot be neither true nor false when A is true.  
[…] 
 
7. A Strong Conditional for a Fuzzy Logic 
 The logic that is the topic of this section is J. Łukasiewicz’s logic Ł. Ł is what is known 
as a fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logics have an infinity of truth values, one for every real number between 
0 and 1, which are interpreted as being degrees of truth—ways of being more-or- less true, or 
partially true and partially false. Such logics are often motivated by an ancient puzzle known as 
the Sorities Paradox. One instance of the paradox is this: Suppose there is a baby girl named 
‘Tracy’. Over time Tracy grows up, and eventually she will be an adult. A few moments after 
being born, Tracy is not an adult by any stretch of the imagination. At age fifty, she is an adult if 
anyone is. Now, it seems very plausible to claim that if Tracy is not an adult at some time t, she 
will also not be an adult one second later. She is not an adult a second after being born, nor is she 
an adult one second after that, nor one second after that… but eventually those seconds will add 
up to fifty years, and if this line of reasoning is correct she will still not be an adult! In classical 
logic, the principle of bivalence, which holds that every sentence is either true or false seems to 
demand that there’s some precise point in the course of Tracy’s life when she goes from being a 
child to being an adult. That is counterintuitive, to put it mildly. “Fuzzy logicians” propose 
replace that point with a smooth gradient: As Tracy gets older, that claim that she is an adult 
gradually goes from being mildly true to moderately true to very true, and eventually to being 
completely true.  
 In Łukasiewicz’s logic Ł the definition of negation is: 
v(¬p) = 1 – v(p) 
That is, ¬p's degree of truth is 1 minus the degree of truth of p, which seems plausible enough. 
 The definition of conjunction is: 
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  v(p ⋀ q) = Min(v(p), v(q)) 
This means that the truth value of ┌p ⋀ q┐ is the minimum of the value of p and the value of q—
the value of whichever of them happens to be lower (If their values are equal, it has the value 
they share.) This is a generalization of the definition of conjunction for classical logic: 0 is less 
than 1, so if either p or q has the value 0 ┌p ⋀ q┐ must have the value 0 as well. If p and q both 
have the value 1, ┌p ⋀ q┐ has the value 1. 
 It proves to be just as easy to define disjunction as it was to define conjunction: 
 v(p ∨ q) = Max(v(p), v(q)) 
The truth value of ┌p ∨ q┐ is the maximum of the values of p and q—the value of whichever of 
them happens to be greater (As above, if their values are equal, it has the value they share.) This 
is a generalization of the definition of disjunction for classical logic: 1 is greater than 0, so if 
either p or q has the value 1 so does ┌p ∨ q┐, and if both p and q have the value 0 then ┌p ∨ q┐ 
does too.[…] 
MŁ contains an operator which we have not yet encountered in any of the preceding languages. 
This is the operator [d], which I call ‘op’, which in a sense bridges the gap between MŁ and Ł+. 
Op is an operator forming operator: It takes a degree of truth, d, and forms a sentential operator 
which, when prefixed to a sentence p, has the effect of saying that p has d as its degree of truth. 
[…] 
 We come now to the definition of MŁ’s conditional designator. If ┌(q|p)┐ is empty, v(p → 
q) = 0. If ┌(q|p)┐ is not empty and p’s degree of truth, d, is 1, then v(p → q) = ┌(q|p)┐. If ┌(q|p)┐  
is not empty and d is distinct from 1, we can “fudge”: 
┌(q |[d]p)┐ = v(p → q)  
The reason we can fudge is that v([d]p) = 1 iff v(p) = d. If a sentence attributes to p any value 
other than d, that sentence has the value 0. Thus, any sentence which has an operator formed 
from op as its main operator either has 1 or 0 as its truth value; there are no intermediate 
possibilities.  
 Now, if we wish to know, for example, what value A  ∨ ¬A must take when A is true to 
the degree 0.75, we begin by substituting ‘0.75’ for ‘d’ in op and by substituting ‘A’ for ‘p’ to 
form the sentence [0.75]A. Then we take both of these sentences and substitute them into MŁ’s 
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conditional designator, yielding: (A ∨ ¬A | [0.75]A). To evaluate this sentence, we start (surprise!) 
by constructing a truth table in MŁ: 
 
A ¬A A  ∨ ¬A [0.75]A (A ∨ ¬A | [0.75]A) 
1 0 1 0 0.75 
0.75 0.25 0.75 1 0.75 
0 1 1 0 0.75 
 
If we want to know what value A ∨ ¬A takes when A takes on other values, say 0.50 or 0.25, we 
proceed similarly: 
 
A ¬A A  ∨ ¬A [0.50]A (A ∨ ¬A | [0.50]A) [0.25]A (A ∨ ¬A | [0.25]A) 
1 0 1 0 0.50 0 0.75 
0.50 0.50 0.50 1 0.50 0 0.75 
0.25 0.75 0.75 0 0.50 1 0.75 
0 1 1 0 0.50 0 0.75 
 
[…] 
